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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 6 1967-1968 NUMBER 4
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE
J. CRIS SOICH*
The case of Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company v. Blumling' is
one of first impression in Pennsylvania and concerns the interpretation
of the uninsured motorist coverage statute.2 Before dealing with the
factual situation involved in this case, certain comments must be made
concerning the legislation involved and its background. Only by review-
ing the history of the general problem involved in this case can one
obtain an understanding of the decision of the court and an appreciation
of the true effect of that decision.
As our country became more mobile, the use of the nation's highways
by the general public became commonplace. It followed naturally, and
fatalistically, that as more vehicles took to the roads of America more
persons became exposed to the dangers of personal injury resulting from
traffic mishaps. Unfortunately, not all persons whose negligent conduct
inflicted injuries on their fellow travelers could financially meet the
burden placed upon them by the traditional legal processes. A trial in
which compensatory damages were awarded to the innocent parties was
meaningless when the wrong-doer was totally financially irresponsible.
In such a situation the injured party would be left to bear the loss him-
self. As highway usage increased by geometric proportion, there also
increased the number of uncompensated, innocent injured users of our
highways. With the class of injured persons expanding in size, the burden
of sustaining the class became one of statewide significance. To meet this
problem a few states passed statutes making the possession of automobile
liability insurance compulsory, or in the alternative, requiring the posting
of some security bond with the state as a condition precedent to operation
of a motor vehicle within the state.'
* A.B., Grove City College; L.L.B., Duke University. Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. - Pa. -, 241 A.2d 112 (1968).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 2000 (Supp., 1967).
3. North Carolina and Massachusetts were among the first states to adopt compulsory
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Another method of providing a source of recovery for those persons
injured or killed by the wrongful acts of a motorist who, because he is
uninsured and not financially responsible cannot be made to respond
in damages, was the uninsured motorist coverage and its variations.4
Many states have enacted legislation requiring that all automobile liability
policies issued within the state and affecting vehicles to be operated
within the state contain a provision protecting the insured from losses
resulting from injuries and/or death caused by financially irresponsible
drivers.5 As we shall note later these statutes, although varying in some
phrasing, are strikingly similar. They are all designed to provide a
source of recovery for the innocent person who is injured or killed.
Whether that source is liable for only a minimum amount, or is liable
for an unlimited amount is the controversy to be discussed in this article.
Regardless of the amount of recovery, it is clear from a reading of the
statutes that all were intended to give the general public the right to
purchase protection against losses caused by uninsured motorists. No
statute compels public acceptance of the coverage,' but all statutes
obligate the insurers to make such protection available to the public. The
final effect of the uninsured motorist statute is to provide a source of
recovery for the innocent motoring public, absent the harsh inflexibility
that can exist in a compulsory liability insurance program.
By the Act of August 14, 1963, Public Law 909, the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania joined those states providing for the availability of un-
insured motorist protection for its citizens.7 The statute provides that:
No policy of insurance insuring against loss resulting from lia-
bility imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any
person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this
State with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this State, unless coverage is provided therein or sup-
plemental thereto in limits for bodily injury or death as are fixed
from time to time by the General Assembly in section 1421 of
Article XIV of "The Vehicle Code," act of April 29, 1959 (P.L.
financial responsibility laws. The merits and/or problems connected with this approach to
the problem are beyond the purview of this paper and mention is made only for the pur-
pose of indicating the existence of an alternative approach.
4. In New York, New Jersey, Maryland and North Dakota, the state maintains a
fund providing for a source of recovery. These state administered funds are in operation
similar to the funds created by the uninsured motorist coverage contained in automobile
liability policies. It should be noted that the procedures for collection from such funds vary,
but the differences do not affect the theory upon which the fund operates.
5. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 2000 (Supp., 1967).
6. As will be seen later, the uninsured motorist coverage statute does give the in-
sured the right to reject the coverage.
7. See note 2, supra.
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58), under provisions approved by the Insurance Commissioner,
for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of unin-
sured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or dis-
ease, including death resulting therefrom: Provided, however,
That the named insured shall have the right to reject such
coverage in writing: And provided further, That unless the
named insured requests such coverage in writing, such coverage
need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy
where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection
with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer.
There are several items in the above quoted statute that require some
comment at this juncture, since their provisions shall be of extreme
importance later.8
It should be noted first that the statute compels the insurance indus-
try to makc the uninsured motorist coverage available within the State.
Secondly, the statute establishes the dollar limit of the coverage by
delegating to the Insurance Commissioner the power to approve the
limits of coverage. This statute does not establish the maximum coverage,
but rather, speaks only of damages to which the named insured is legally
entitled. From this, it can be seen that the legislature did not attempt to
place a ceiling upon the right of recovery by an injured insured. Finally,
it should be noted that the insured is given the absolute right to reject
the protection mandated by the State and assume for himself the risk of
sustaining injuries for which he cannot be compensated.9
Before discussing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's construction of
this statute, we must look to other jurisdictions that faced the same ques-
tion, since the Blumling decision was rendered only after a review of such
other decisions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was without any clear-
cut national trend to follow in deciding the question presented to it. This
absence is based upon the fact that the decisions of each state construe
particular enabling statutes and must, therefore, be limited by those
statutes. The variations in wording among the statutes interpreted tend
to prevent application of sweeping generalities. However, the rationale of
these decisions did have an impact on our court and for that reason a
review of the decisions of other courts becomes important.
The first appellate court decision in the field of unisured motorist
coverage came out of United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit.
In Travelers Indemnity Company v. Wells'0 the court was faced with a
8. Although the wording of the various statutes varies to some extent, the provisions
hereinafter discussed are similar in all jurisdictions reviewed.
9. The provisions for rejection require a writing by the insured, thus insuring an
intelligent waiver of protection. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 40, § 2000 (Supp., 1967).
10. 316 F.2d 770 (1963).
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petition by the insurer arguing that its uninsured coverage was not
available to the estate of one of its insureds and to another insured for
injuries sustained." The factual situation giving rise to the proceeding
was an accident in which six persons were injured, two of them fatally, by
an uninsured motorist. The insurance carrier covering the vehicle in
which the victims were passengers paid the total limit of its uninsured
coverage limit. One deceased passenger and one injured passenger were
also insured by Travelers whose policy contained the uninsured motorist
endorsement. The claim under this provision was denied by the insurer.
The court of appeals held that the Travelers policy was not applicable to
the situation presented,' 2 asserting that the mere fact that other claims
exhausted the limits of the policy on the vehicle in which the claimants
were passengers did not make the Travelers policy applicable. The court
interpreted the statute by stating:
(T)he law did not propose to provide an injured guest with
uninsured protection beyond the statutory amounts through a
combination of the host's insurance and that owned by the guest
for himself. If the claim of the Wells' was correct, then the unin-
sured endorsement would guarantee to policyholders a solvency
on the part of an uninsured far greater than that required for
him to qualify as an insured motorist.... ."
To buttress its finding the court also pointed out that the administrative
agency charged with administering the insurance laws of Virginia had
approved the wording of the Travelers insurance policy including the
condition, hereinafter referred to as the "other insurance clause," 4 that
provided:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an
automobile not owned by the named insured under this endorse-
ment, the insurance hereunder shall apply only as excess insur-
ance over any other similar insurance available to such occupant,
and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which
the applicable limit of liability of this endorsement exceeds the
sum of the applicable limits of liability of all such other insur-
ance. (Emphasis by the Court.)' 5
11. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia had held
that the coverage was available since once the "primary coverage" had been exhausted by
other claimants, the present claimants had "no other insurance" available to them. Travelers
Indemnity Company v. Wells, 209 F. Supp. 784 (1962).
12. 316 F.2d 770.
13. Id., at 773.
14. It should be noted that the clause quoted above, like the various statutes mandating
the uninsured motorist coverage, will be strikingly similar in all cases to be reviewed. This
similarity will permit the general reference to the condition as the "other insurance clause"
throughout.
15. 316 F.2d at 772.
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This administrative construction, in the absence of any pronouncement
from the appellate courts of Virginia, 6 was considered to be authorita-
tive and worthy of adoption. The appeals court thus declared the policy
unavailable to the claimants.
Rather than attempt a chronological review of the decisions in this
area, the history of the decisions in individual states will be followed to
conclusion. The case of Bryant v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Company1 7 gave the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals the
opportunity to face the same problem decided in Wells. Here Bryant was
severely injured while operating a vehicle owned by his father; the in-
juries resulted from the negligence of an uninsured motorist. Bryant
brought suit against the uninsured motorist and received judgment in the
amount of $85,000. At the time of the accident, Bryant's father was in-
sured by State Farm, whose policy covered occupants of the insured
vehicle, and Bryant himself was also insured by State Farm. Both policies
contained protection against uninsured motorists. State Farm paid the
full limit of their coverage under the policy issued to the father. Bryant
then made claim under his own policy. State Farm refused any additional
payment relying upon the following provision:
(W)ith respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying
an automobile not owned by the named insured under this
coverage, the insurance hereunder shall apply only as excess
insurance over any other similar insurance available to such
occupant, and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount
by which the applicable limit of liability of this coverage exceeds
the sum of the applicable limits of all such other insurance.'
The sole question before the court was whether the limiting language of
this "other insurance clause" was effective and valid under the terms of
the Virginia statute.' 9
16. In Drewry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 204 Va. 213, 129
S.E.2d 681 (1963), decided approximately one month earlier, the Supreme Court of Virginia
had given some indication of the path they intended to follow in this area. The Court held
in Drewry that where two uninsured motorists are concurrently negligent and therby in-
flict one injury upon the plaintiff, the plaintiff's recovery is limited to the single uninsured
motorist coverage. If, however, the uninsured motorists were independently negligent, the
plaintiff would be entitled to the dual coverage.
17. 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
18. Id., at 818. Note that the language of the "other insurance clause" here is almost
identical to the language involved in Travelers Indemnity Company v. Wells. See note 14
supra, and accompanying text.
19. Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-381(b)(Supp., 1968) provides:
Nor shall any such policy or contract relating to ownership, maintenance or use of
a motor vehicle be so issued or delivered unless it contains an endorsement or
provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally en-
titled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
1967-1968]
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The Virginia Supreme Court approached the problem by reiterating
that the uninsured motorist law was enacted for the benefit of injured
persons and was to be liberally construed to accomplish that purpose.
The court referred to an earlier decision wherein it had been held that
any language in the insurance policies that conflicted with the statute
was void. z" It pointed out then that the statute2 ' demands that all liability
policies issued undertake to pay the insured all sums he is legally en-
titled to receive for injuries sustained because of conduct of an uninsured
motorist. The only limitation mentioned by the statute is the policy limit.
The policy provision above referred to limits the statute's application
by paying, not all sums which the insured is entitled to recover, but only
such sum as exceeds the other applicable insurance. The court stated
"Clearly this provision places a limitation upon the requirement of the
statute and conflicts with the plain terms of the statute. It is, therefore,
illegal and of no effect." 2 The court concluded that the insured could,
therefore, collect the unpaid portion of his judgment within the limit of
his policy. The Court disposed of the Wells decision2 3 by stating that the
other insurance provisions are invalid because they conflict with the
statute. This decision with its broad, liberal approach to the question of
uninsured motorist coverage was destined to become the leading case in
what has been referred to as the liberal position. However, it is interest-
ing to note that this liberal decision is based completely upon a literal
reading of the creative statute. As will be seen in later decisions, the literal
readings of statutes has become less important and greater emphasis has
been attached to the liberal result obtained in Virginia.
A judicial story very similar to the Virginia evolution occurred in
Florida. As was true in Virginia, the first interpretation of the "other
insurance clause's" effect on the creating statute took place in the Federal
Courts of Florida. In Chandler v. Government Employees Insurance
Company24 an insured sought to recover under the uninsured motorist
provisions of his policy for injuries inflicted upon him by an uninsured
motorist while a passenger in an automobile of another insured party.
It was his contention that his policy should be applicable since his host's
policy did not adequately protect all injured parties. The court indicated
that the Florida statute21 requires all liability policies issued to include
vehicle, within limits which shall be no less than the requirements of § 46.1-1(8)
as amended from time to time ...
20. Storm v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 199 Va. 132, 97 S.E.2d 759 (1957).
21. See note 19, supra.
22. 140 S.E.2d at 820.
23. See note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
24. 342 F.2d 420 (1965).
25. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0851(1) (1965):
No automobile liability insurance, covering liability arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in
[Vol. 6:341
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coverage in set limits against injuries inflicted by uninsured motorists.
Without setting out the applicable language, the court indicated that
the insured's policy contained the "other insurance clause" which made
the coverage inapplicable because the insured was, at the time of his
injury, a passenger in a vehicle of another insured person. The court, in
a per curiam decision, concluded ". . . that the public policy of the State
of Florida, in providing for such protection, was to afford the public
generally the same protection that it would have had if the uninsured
motorist had carried the minimum of $10,000 and $20,000 limits as
public liability coverage."26 The court acknowledged the inadequacy of
the coverage on the host's vehicle, but having determined the public
policy to be the provision of minimum coverage, the claimant's con-
tention was rejected. In this case then we have a clear statement of the
conservative interpretation of the policy behind the uninsured motorist
law, to wit: a minimum source of recovery.
The Florida Supreme Court first faced the interpretation of the unin-
sured motorist law in Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com-
pany.2 7 The question to be determined was stated by the court. "May
an auto liability insurance carrier providing coverage against injury by
uninsured motorists in accord with the requirements of § 627.0851
Florida Statutes [F. S. A.], after accepting a premium for such coverage,
deny coverage on the ground that the insured has other similar insurance
available to him?"2 After reviewing the Virginia cases previously re-
ferred to the court stated that the specific question must be answered in
the negative.2" The court quickly went on to point out that they did not
intend to permit an insured to collect more than his actual damage.
Furthermore, the court stated that when several policies apply to an
accident and where the insured's damages do not exceed the total of the
limits of the various policies, the damages should be pro-rated among
the interested insurers." On considering the intent of the statute the court
this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in
this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less
than limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved by
the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, re-
sulting therefrom; provided, however, that the coverage required under this section
shall not be applicable where any insured named in the policy shall reject the
coverage; provided further that, unless the named insured requests such coverage
in writing, the coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy
where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with a policy
previously issued to him by the same insurer.
26. 342 F.2d at 421.
27. 185 So.2d 689, - Fla. - (1966).
28. Id., at 690.
29. Id., at 691.
30. Id., at 692.
1967-1968]
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
stated, "We consider that it provides for a limited type of compulsory
automobile liability coverage."'" This being true, the conclusion is that
the insured may collect under so many policies as he is the beneficiary of,
up to the lesser of the limit of the policies, or the extent of hi§ damage.
In reaching the decision that the "other insurance clause" was void, the
Supreme Court of Florida made no reference to the Chandler2 decision.
The language of the decision leaves no doubt, but that the policy under-
lying the Chandler case is rejected.
Before reviewing the decisions contrary to the Virginia and Florida
position, a brief discussion should be made of a hybrid case in this area.
In Maryland Casualty Company v. Howe," the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire was faced with a petition for declaratory judgment to deter-
mine the maximum limits of liability under the uninsured motorists
endorsements of two liability policies. Both policies contained the "other
insurance clauses" limiting liability to the extent by which the policy
coverage exceeded other applicable insurance. The court stated that the
uninsured motorist law was intended to close certain deficiencies in the
financial responsibility laws of New Hampshire and also provide protec-
tion for those injured by uninsured motorists. It asserted also that:
The design and purpose of the uninsured motorist insurance
statute was to provide protection only up to the minimum
statutory limits for bodily injuries caused by financially irre-
sponsible motorists. The statute was not designed to provide
the insured with greater insurance protection than would have
been available had the insured been injured by an operator with
a policy containing minimum statutory limits. 4
The holding of the court, in essence, is that the "other insurance clauses"
are consistent with the applicable statute. At first blush, this decision
would appear to be in complete accord with Wells and Chandler. In fact,
the language here used could easily appear in either of the Federal
Court decisions. There is one variation present in this case which effec-
tively demands the result reached and which appears in the statute
creating the coverage. 5 The last clause of the statute provides "... and
31. Id.
32. See note 24, supra.
33. 106 N.H. 422, 213 A.2d 420 (1965).
34. Id., at 422.
35. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 268:15 (1955) provides:
No motor vehicle liability policy, as defined in section 1, shall be issued or de-
livered in the state, until a copy of the form of the policy has been on file with
the insurance commissioner for at least thirty days, unless during said period the
insurance commissioner shall have approved in writing the form of the policy, nor
shall such policy be issued if the insurance commissioner notifies the insurance
company in writing that, in his opinion, the form of the policy does not comply
with the laws of the state. Notification of his approval or disapproval shall be
[Vol. 6:341
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
any such policy may further provide for the pro-rating of the insurance
thereunder with other applicable, valid and collectible insurance.1 36
Thus, without specifically stating, the court was forced to conclude that
the "other insurance clauses" were contemplated by the legislature and
consequently were in fact consistent with the statute. It is submitted
that the foresight apparent in the New Hampshire legislature provided
clear guidelines for the court. Unfortunately, such has not been the
situation in other jurisdictions.3 7
If the number of decisions in this area were divided between those
jurisdictions permitting recovery and those denying recovery under two
policies, the states permitting the dual recovery would be in a clear
minority. As the Bryant case serves as the landmark in permitting dual
recovery, the distinction of being the guide for the conservative approach
must go to Burcham v. Farmers Insurance Exchange." There the claimant
was injured while a passenger in a non-owned automobile due to the
negligence of an uninsured motorist. After settling the claim with the
host's carrier, the claimant turned to the policies issued to the head of
the household in which the claimant resided. All of the policies contained
uninsured motorist coverage in the same limits and all contained the
given in writing within said period. No such policy shall be issued or delivered
in this state with respect to a motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer registered in
this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto in amounts
or limits prescribed for bodily injury or death for a liability policy under this
chapter, under provisions approved by the insurance commissioner, for the pro-
tection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles, trailers, or semi-trailers and
hit-and-run motor vehicles, trailers or semi-trailers because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom. The insurance commissioner
shall approve a form of policy which contains the name and address of the insured,
a description of the motor vehicles and trailers or semi-trailers covered, with the
premium charges therefor, the policy period, the limits of liability as between the
insured and the insurance company, and an agreement that insurance is provided in
accordance with and subject to the provisions of this chapter. The policy may pro-
vide that the insured, or any other person covered by the policy shall reimburse the
insurance carrier for payment made on account of any loss or damage claim or
suit involving a breach of the terms, provisions or conditions of the policy; and
further, if the policy shall provide for limits in excess of the limits specified in
this chapter, the insurance carrier may plead against any plaintiff, with respect to
the amount of such excess limits of liability, any defenses which it may be entitled
to plead against the insured, and any such policy may further provide for the
prorating of the insurance thereunder with other applicable valid and collectible
insurance.
36. Id.
37. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(d) (West, 1955) provides similar guidance by stating
". the policy or endorsement [uninsured motorist] may provide that if the insured has
insurance available to him under more than one uninsured motorist coverage provision, any
damages . . . shall be prorated between the applicable coverages as the limits of each
coverage bears to the total of such limits."
38. 255 Iowa 69, 121 N.W.2d 500 (1963).
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standard "other insurance clause." Without discussing the legislative
intent, the court denied recovery against the claimant's own carrier. The
court felt that the "other insurance clause" represented an understanding
between the insured and the insurer that the total amount available to
an injured policyholder would be the limit stated in the "other insurance
clause." 9 On this basis, the claim was denied. However, most courts
subscribing to the "Burcham view" do so on other grounds.
The most common approach ° to the problem is represented by Tindall
v. Farmers Automobile Management Corporation.41 After exhausting the
limits of the host's policy, the estate of the guest passenger sought to
recover under the policy issued to the decedent's husband for the death
caused by the uninsured motorist. The court admitted that the uninsured
motorist coverage was designed to remove the hardship from those per-
sons innocently injured by uninsured drivers. But nonetheless it read
the creating statute as intending to provide ". . . coverage to the same
extent as would have been in effect if the tort feasor had complied with
the minimum requirements of the financial responsibility act."42 This
being the intent of the statute, as judicially determined, the court con-
cluded that the "other insurance clause" should be given full force and
effect. The mere fact that the primary coverage did not fully compensate
the injured was not, in the court's opinion, reason enough to set aside
the "other insurance clause." To the court the claimant was in the same
position he would have been in had the tort feasor owned a minimum
coverage policy.43
39. This rationale raises the question of the contract of adhesion. The Pennsylvania
Court has dealt with this matter, in unrelated areas, in the cases of Thomas v. First
National Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954), and Cutler Corporation
v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953). It is submitted that there are few better
examples of contracts of adhesion than the insurance contract where the insurer prepares
the standardized terms and the insured simply adheres to them. This being so, the policy
language should be construed against the insurer whenever ambiguities arise.
40. For other cases following the rationale hereinafter discussed see: Globe Indemnity
Company v. Baker's Estate, 22 App. Div. 2d 658, 253 N.Y.S. 2d 170 (1964); Kirby v.
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 42 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1965); and Miller v. Allstate Insurance
Company, 66 Wash.2d 871, 405 P.2d 712 (1965).
41. 83 Ill. App. 2d 165, 226 N.E.2d 397 (1967).
42. Id., at 399.
43. The Court refers to the Virginia decision but passes it off as being a matter
of state statutory construction. If this is accepted on statement alone it would
appear to be well within the court's prerogative to ignore the statutes of other
jurisdictions. But when one reads the Illinois Statute in comparison with the
Virginia act set out in note 19, supra, the similarity seems to demand a closer study.
Paragraph 755a of Chapter 73 ILL. REV. STAT. provides: (1) On or after the effective
date of this amendatory Act of 1963, no policy insuring against loss resulting from
liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out
of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be renewed or delivered
or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered
or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supple-
[Vol. 6:341
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Another approach to the problem was taken in Louisiana when two
cases involving uninsured motorist claims and the effect of the "other
insurance clause" were presented in LeBlanc v. Allstate Insurance Com-
pany44 and Courville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany.45 Both cases rose out of an accident in which three persons were
seriously injured, one of them fatally, by the conduct of an uninsured
motorist. After the policy applying to the host's vehicle was exhausted,
the injured parties sought to recover under their own policies, but both
were met with the defense that the "other insurance clauses" made the
coverage not applicable. Those clauses provided, as it did in the other
cases reviewed, that:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an
automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under
Part IV [to wit: the uninsured motorist coverage] shall apply
only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance avail-
able to such insured and applicable to such automobile as pri-
mary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in the
amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds
the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance."
In weighing the claims and defenses, the court here turned to the ad-
ministrative agency charged with approving insurance provisions in
Louisiana, namely, the Commissioner of Insurance. The Court stated,
"The courts of this state have consistently recognized that interpretation
placed upon statutes, rules and regulations by administrators thereof will
be accepted by the courts if they are reasonable and equitable."" Since
the Commissioner had indicated that the host's coverage would extinguish
the passenger's carrier's liability, the court adopted the same position.
The court reviewed briefly the decisions of other jurisdictions and dis-
missed the contention that the Virginia and Florida positions were cor-
rect by stating, "Louisiana statutes do not make the requirement of the
Virginia or Florida statutes . . . 2 8 The court ended its opinion by up-
mental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in Sec. 7-203 of the
'Illinois Motor Vehicle Law', approved July 11, 1957, as heretofore and hereafter
amended, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally en-
titled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles
and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, in-
cluding death, resulting therefrom, except that the named insured shall have the
right to reject such coverage only on policies delivered, renewed or issued for
delivery prior to July 1, 1967.
44. - La. -, 194 So.2d 791 (1967).
45. - La. -, 194 So.2d 797 (1967).
46. 194 So.2d at 792.
47. 194 So.2d at 794.
48. Id. at 795. However, we should compare the LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:1406D (19-)
with the Virginia statute set out in note 19 supra and the Florida statute referred to in note
25, supra. The Louisiana statute provides:
No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership,
1967-1968]
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holding the validity of the "other insurance clause" by quoting with
approval the statement appearing in Couch on Insurance49 indicating that
the intent of uninsured motorist coverage is to provide the injured insured
with the same protection he would have had available if the uninsured
motorist had been covered by a standard liability policy. Thus, on the
basis of a textbook and an administrative ruling, the insured's claim was
denied.O
As we have just seen in the foregoing review, those states which have
refused to permit the so-called double recovery constitute a substantial
majority in this area. Before passing on to a discussion of the Pennsylvania
decisions, it is wise at this time to review briefly the states which have
joined in the so-called "minority position." Perhaps the most frequently
cited, exclusive of the Bryant and Sellers cases is the case of Smith v.
Pacific Automobile Insurance Co. 51 This case involved an appeal from a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment concerning the rights of the parties
under the uninsured motorist coverage of an automobile liability policy.
As in the other cases discussed, the claimant here was a passenger in an
automobile to which there was applicable liability insurance which con-
tained the uninsured motorist coverage provision. The claimant passenger
was injured substantially through the negligence of an uninsured motorist.
As in the other cases, the claimant was himself insured by the defendant
in the instant case with a policy containing the uninsured motorist cov-
erage. Without litigation, the claimant settled his claim with the liability
carrier for his host, and then made claim against his own carrier. This
claim was denied and the Petition for Declaratory Judgment was filed.
The insurer defended on the basis of the "other insurance clause" that
appeared in the host's liability policy which provided:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured * * * [Smith]
through being struck by an uninsured automobile, if such insured
[Smith] is a named insured under other similar insurance avail-
able to him, then the damages shall be deemed not to exceed
* * * [$5,000], and the company shall not be liable under this
maintenance or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery
in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged
in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less
than the limits described in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law of
Louisiana, under provisions filed with and approved by the Commissioner of In-
surance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled
to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because
of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; provided,
however, that the coverage required under this section shall not be applicable
where any insured named in the policy shall reject the coverage.
49. 12 CoucH, INsURANcE, 570, § 45:623 (2d ed. 1964).
50. Two justices dissented vigorously on this basis.
51. 240 Or. 167, 400 P.2d 512 (1965).
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part for a greater proportion of the [$5,000] than such limit
bears to the sum of the applicable limits of this insurance and
such other insurance. 2
The insurer then pointed to the language in the claimant's own policy
which provided "With respect to bodily injury to * * * [Smith] while
occupying [another's] automobile, the insurance hereunder shall apply
only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to
* * * [Smith], and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by
which * * * [$5,000] exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of all such
other insurance.""8 The insurer then contended that, on the basis of the
above quoted provisions, the insured was bound by the construction of
the clause that holds that only the excess over and above the "primary"
coverage is available. Since in the instant case the limits of both policies
were the same, the insurer contended that their policy was not available
to the insured. In construing the "other insurance" clauses, the court
pointed out that to give a litera! effect to each of a series of multiple other
insurance clauses in a given case could result in no coverage at all to the
insured. The court, therefore, took the equitable approach and held that
when the two other insurance clauses are repugnant to each other, the
clauses should be disregarded and the loss prorated between the involved
carriers. The court admitted that this holding is arbitrary but pointed
out that the equities involved demand such a result. The court went on to
pass upon the contention that the primary/secondary argument binds
the insured by stating that the usages of the insurance business should
not determine the legal rights of the parties. The court wisely indicated
that at any time the industry could partially reverse its stand on the
primary and secondary features of different liability policies and thereby
create an interaction of two policies, each dependent upon the other
for primary payment. Such a result would clearly violate the equities
involved, and the court, therefore, by this holding, refused to permit such
a potentiality. Perhaps the most significant portion of this decision in-
volves the Oregon court's answer to the' insurer's contention that the
holding sought by the insured permits the insured to recover more than
the minimum amount. It will be recalled that this has been the basis for
the decisions previously reviewed (to wit: the uninsured motorist cov-
erage is intended to provide a minimum source of recovery for the
injured insured). The court's answer to this contention is found at 515
where the court states:
The rule against multiple recovery was derived from fire-in-
surance cases. In the case of a loss by fire, the monetary loss is
usually easily measured and in certain instances it can be shown
52. Id., at 513-14.
53. Id., at 514.
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that the total damage suffered by the plaintiff was less than the
combined insurance proceeds sought to be recovered. However,
in the field of life and accident insurance, the damages to the
person are not readily measured in money and there is little
likelihood of either fraud or profit through overinsurance.
Furthermore, the mere assertion that one would seek out an
accident with an uninsured motorist in order to collect upon
someone else's insurance policy contains its own answer. In
the case at bar, there is no reason to deny the insured the bene-
fits for which he has contracted under his own insurance simply
because he also has some incidental rights as a third party bene-
ficiary under another person's insurance.5 4
The court, therefore, concluded that this claimant could recover under
both of the involved policies.55
We have now seen a new and different approach to the problem of
the other insurance question in the Smith case from Oregon where the
court admittedly rendered its decision upon a sense of overriding equity
which would be violated should an insurer be permitted to deny the
coverage purchased by its insured solely on the basis of the existence of
some coincidental coverage. The next case joining the "liberal" approach
was Moore v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company.5" In this case the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina was called upon to construe its statute
which created the uninsured motorist coverage in that state.57 The facts of
the case again involved an injury, in this situation fatal in nature, to a
passenger involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist where two
policies were applicable. In determining the effect of the "other insurance
clause," the court pointed out that the uninsured motorist statute was
enacted as a direct result of the public concern over the problem arising
from property damage, personal injury and death inflicted by uninsured
and financially irresponsible motorists. The court went on to hold that
the purpose was to provide within fixed limits some financial recompense
to innocent persons who received injury through the wrongful conduct
of an uninsured motorist. The court concluded its interpretation of the
intention of the statute by pointing out that the statute provides for a
limited type of compulsory automobile liability coverage. And after a
lengthly review of similar cases in other jurisdictions, the court clearly
54. Id., at 515.
55. Id. One justice dissented.
56. 270 N.C. 776, 155 S.E.2d 128 (1967).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. 20-279.21(b)(3) (Supp., 1967) provides: "No policy of bodily
injury liability insurance, covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of any motor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this State with respect
to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this State unless coverage is pro-
vided therein or supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in sub-
section (c) of § 20-279.5. .... "
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stated that the other insurance clauses are contrary to the statutory
limited amount of coverage and that the purpose of the statute was to
protect the insured as to his actual loss within the limits established by
the Assembly. Therefore, the court held that so long as the total damages
exceed the limits of one policy and there is another policy involved, the
statute clearly permits the insured to recover under both policies and
any attempt to limit that recovery would violate the statute and con-
sequently be void. Thus Moore joins North Carolina with Virginia,
Florida and Oregon in permitting the dual recovery although on more
conventional grounds than set forth in Smith v. Pacific Automobile In-
surance Company.5 8
With this review of the decisions in other jurisdictions, we turn
to the question of the uninsured motorist coverage in Pennsylvania. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was first called upon to interpret the
uninsured motorist coverage in light of the enabling legislation in the
case of Pattani v. Keystone Insurance Company. 9 Although this case did
not touch upon the problem here under discussion, the holding in the
case did give a clear indication of the Pennsylvania court's disposition
toward a liberal interpretation of the statute. In Pattani, the plaintiff was
injured by an insured driver. However, before the original claim could be
disposed of, the defendant's insurance carrier became insolvent and
went into receivership. The plaintiff thereupon made claim against his
own carrier in accordance with the uninsured motorist protection con-
tained in his own policy. The insurer denied the coverage on the basis that
at the instant of the accident, there was no uninsured motorist since the
original defendant did have a policy applicable to the accident. This
claim was presented to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania where it was
held that the insolvency of the carrier subsequent to the accident did not
make the uninsured motorist provision of the policy applicable." The
supreme court, with two Justices dissenting, reversed the superior court.
It held that the insolvency of a tort feasor's carrier after an accident and
the consequent refusal or inability of that carrier to defend or pay the
judgment for which the insured has become liable constitutes a denial of
coverage within the uninsured motorist provision of the policy and
entitles the insured to proceed in accordance with his own policy. In
reaching this conclusion, the court quoted extensively from the California
decision of Katz v. American Motorist Insurance Company.61 Of partic-
ular significance is the court's final statement that "such statutes [i.e.,
uninsured motorists statutes], must be liberally construed to carry out
this objective of providing compensation for those injured through no
58. 240 Or. 167, 400 P.2d 512 (1965).
59. 426 Pa. 332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967).
60. Levy v. Keystone Insurance Company, 209 Pa. Super. 15, 223 A.2d 899 (1966).
61. 53 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1966).
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fault of their own."62 It is therefore clear, based on this decision, that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave fair warning that it intended to place
a liberal construction upon the uninsured motorist statute and to create
not a minimum source of recovery but to provide recovery for damages
that an innocent, injured party might sustain through the negligence of an
irresponsible driver who could not be made to respond adequately for
the injuries inflicted. Adding the Pattani decision to the state of the law
in other jurisdictions, we now have the back-drop for Harleysville v.
Blumling.6 3
On January 25, 1965, Francis J. Blumling of the City of Pittsburgh was
an employee of the Lockhart Iron & Steel Company. Mr. Blumling was
employed as a truck driver on that date, and his employer, Lockhart Iron
& Steel, had provided for the insuring of its motor vehicles with the
Travelers Indemnity Company. Francis Blumling had obtained liability
insurance on his own personal vehicle through the Harleysville Mutual
Insurance Company. Both companies included in their policies protection
against injuries inflicted by uninsured motorists. The Harleysville policy
issued to Mr. Blumling provided:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an
automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under
Part 4 [uninsured motorist coverage] shall apply only as excess
insurance over any other similar insurance available to such
insured and applicable to such automobile as primary insurance
and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which
the limits of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable
limit of liability of such other insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured
has other similar insurance available to him and applicable to
the accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the
higher of applicable limits of liability of this insurance and
such other insurance and the company shall not be liable for a
greater proportion of any loss to which this coverage applies than
the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable
limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance.
64
At about 2:30 P.M. on the above mentioned date, Francis Blumling
was traveling in a general eastwardly direction on Legislative Route
10010 in Middlesex Township in Butler County. At the same time, one
James Adams of Mars, Pennsylvania, was operating a truck in a general
westwardly direction on the same public highway. Suddenly, the Adams
vehicle crossed over into the lane of traffic in which Mr. Blumling was
62. Id., at 672.
63. 241 A.2d 112.
64. Id., at 114.
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operating; and the two vehicles collided violently resulting in the death
of James Adams and the serious injuries being inflicted upon Francis
Blumling 5 It was clearly established that at the time of this accident,
James Adams, the deceased, was uninsured and it was further established
that at the time of the accident, Francis Blumling was in the course of
his employment and was, therefore, covered by the liability policy issued
by Travelers Indemnity Company to Lockhart Iron & Steel. Under the
terms of their policy, Travelers paid to Blumling the full limit of their
policy (to wit: $10,000.00).66 Because of the severity of the injuries
sustained, Francis Blumling then sought to recover from his own carrier,
Harleysville Mutual. It should be noted that Harleysville did not contest
the allegation by Blumling that the total damages sustained did, in fact,
exceed the $10,000.00 limit of the Travelers policy. However, as in the
cases previously reviewed, Harleysville opposed payment on the basis of
the above quoted "other insurance clause."
Tn hnpes of determining its liability, Harleysville Mutual filed a Petition
for Declaratory Judgment in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County. After all pleadings were submitted and arguments made, the
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County by the Honorable John J.
McClain, Jr., entered the following order:
And now this 15th day of June, 1967, following argument and
in consideration of the pleadings and briefs of counsel, it is or-
dered that defendant's motion for Judgment on the pleadings is
denied and that Judgment is entered for the plaintiff, and it is
declared that the plaintiff is not liable to the defendant under
the uninsured motorist coverage of its policy for injuries suffered
by defendant on January 25, 1965.67
In its opinion the court pointed out that the legislature's intent in enacting
the uninsured motorist statute was to create a prescribed minimum of
insurance available to the insured. The court was impressed by the fact
that the insured was given the right by the statute to reject such coverage
in writing, thus indicating to the trial court that the intent of the
legislature was to create the above mentioned minimum source of recovery.
The court then went on to state that since Blumling and Harleysville
willingly entered into the contract, the exact language of the contract
should control between the parties and that the "other insurance clause"
would control the fact situation before the court. In conclusion, the court
65. Francis Blumling sustained the following injuries: multiple fractures of the left foot,
multiple fractures of the left fibia and femur, fractures of both arms and hands, severe facial
lacerations and cerebral concussion.
66. It should be noted that Travelers deducted from the uninsured motorist limit the
amount paid under the workman's compensation law.
67. Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company v. Blumling, Number 3052, April, 1966.
(Com. Pl. Alleg.)
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held that the fact that Blumling had paid for the premium entitling him
to the coverage was not a legitimate consideration since the premium was
nominal in nature. As cited above, the court then entered its order deny-
ing Blumling the recovery sought. On June 29, 1967, Francis Blumling
appealed the decision of the Court of Common Pleas to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania.
On March 13, 1968, the matter was argued before the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania. In its brief and upon oral argument, Harleysville con-
tended that the clear intent of the act of the legislature creating the
uninsured motorist coverage was to provide a minimum source of
recovery for those persons injured by uninsured motorists. Harleysville
then argued that since Travelers paid to Blumling the full limits of its
policy, the requirement of the statute providing a source of recovery had
been met. Harleysville then pointed out that since the Travelers policy
was available to Blumling at the time of the accident, there was no unin-
sured motorist involved. Consequently, Harleysville could not be called
upon to pay since the Travelers policy was in effect.
Blumling argued that the legislature's intention was to create a source
of recovery. Blumling further pointed out that the creating statute placed
no ceiling upon the amount of recovery but rather established only the
minimum coverage to be made available. Blumling continued his argument
by pointing out that the intent of the statute would be frustrated when
the innocent injured was required to bear even a part of the loss caused
by an uninsured motorist after he, the insured, had taken advantage of
the protection created by the legislature. Blumling concluded his argu-
ment by pointing out that the legislation was obviously intended to
protect the general public and, therefore, should be liberally construed to
permit his recovery.
On April 16, 1968, Mr. Justice O'Brien filed the opinion of the court.
After reviewing the factual situation previously referred to, the court
announced its disagreement with the trial court's conclusion. The opinion
first meets with the contention by Harleysville that Adams was not, in
fact, an uninsured motorist within the meaning of the policy involved.
The court relied upon the definition contained in the policy to find that
Adams was, in fact, an uninsured motorist at the time of the accident.6 8
The mere fact that another liability policy existed did not alter the status
68. The policy defines an uninsured vehicle as "An automobile or trailer with respect
to the ownership, maintenance or use of which there is, in at least the amounts specified
by the financial responsibility law of the state in which the insured automobile is principally
garaged, no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the
accident with respect to any person or organization legally responsible for the use of such
automobile, or with respect to which there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance
policy applicable at the time of the accident but the company writing the same denies
coverage thereunder. .... "
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of the uninsured driver. Therefore, the court rejected the first argument
advanced by Harleysville.
The court then turned to the "other insurance clause;" and after
briefly reviewing the decisions in Oregon, Virginia and Florida, held that
the other insurance clause did not prevent Blumling from recovering in
the instant action. The court pointed out that:
The purpose of the uninsured motorist law is to provide protec-
tion to innocent victims of irresponsible drivers. The amount of
the coverage to be afforded by the uninsured motorist feature
of the policy is set by the statute. But nowhere, explicitly or
implicitly, does the act place a limit upon the total amount a
victim may recover if he suffers a loss resulting from the negli-
gence of an uninsured motorist.69
The court then recalled that in Pattani v. Keystone Insurance Company,0
the declaration of a liberal construction of the statute in order to achieve
the legislative intent was set forth. The court reaffirmed in this decision
its intention to be bound by that liberal construction. The court then
wisely pointed out that this liberal construction does not imply that in-
jured parties may be permitted to pyramid coverage so as to recover
more than the actual loss, but the court does hold that where the loss
exceeds the limits of the one policy, the insured may proceed under other
available policies up to the lesser amount of the total of the available
limits or the amount of the actual loss. The court concluded by stating,
"Appellee, has received its premium attributable to this coverage, which
coverage the Act of Assembly requires it to furnish. We will not permit it
to avoid its statutorily imposed liability by its unilateral insertion into the
policy of a liability limiting clause repugnant to the statute."'" The court,
therefore, reversed the Judgment of the trial court and entered Judgment
in favor of Blumling.72
The key factor in the Harleysville decision was the predetermined
adhesion to the previously announced liberality of construction to be
applied to the uninsured motorists statute. The court, having once com-
mitted itself to this position, was required to continue its liberal approach
to the general welfare statute. In view of the legislature's failure to
provide for a maximum limit of recovery, the liberal interpretation
demands the result here reached. Since the court approvingly cites the
Oregon, Virginia and Florida results, it is wise to compare the statute of
Pennsylvania with the statutes involved in the states referred to.73
69. 241 A.2d at 115.
70. 426 Pa. 332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967).
71. 241 A.2d at 115.
72. Mr. Justice B. R. Jones dissented without opinion.
73. See notes 19 and 25 supra, and note 53 and accompanying text.
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The Pennsylvania statute provides at 40 P.S. 2000
"[N]o policy of insurance insuring against loss resulting from
liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by
any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this
State with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this State, unless coverage is provided therein or
supplemental thereto in limits for bodily injury or death as are
fixed from time to time by the General Assembly in section 1421
of Article XIV of 'The Vehicle Code,' under provisions approved
by the Insurance Commissioner, for the protection of persons
insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom: Provided, however, that the named insured shall
have the right to reject such coverage in writing: And provided
further, that unless the named insured requests such coverage
in writing, such coverage need not be provided in or supple-
mental to a renewal policy where the named insured had rejected
the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to him
by the same insurer." A careful reading of the Pennsylvania
statute in comparison with the Virginia Code and the Florida
statute indicates that the involved legislations are identical in
nature. Therefore, the court could justifiably be guided by the
decisions previously referred to in Oregon, Virginia and Florida.
Comparing the Harleysville decision with the decisions earlier
discussed, the consistency between the statutes and the decisions
themselves is notable. Therefore, it is submitted that the Har-
leysville decision in Pennsylvania represents a sound interpreta-
tion of the statute mandating the uninsured motorist coverage.
Once it has been determined that an innocently injured motorist may
recover under the terms of the uninsured motorist coverage up to the total
of the available limits or to the limit of his actual loss, the potential
aftermath of this decision must be considered. Clearly a decision of this
sort must have an impact upon the general public in the economic sphere.
It is submitted that the insurance industry must, in view of the Harleys-
ville decision, undertake a careful and thorough study of its underwriting
procedures relative to this particular coverage. In view of the interpreta-
tion placed upon the statute and the policy by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, it is clear that the industry can no longer treat the unin-
sured motorist coverage as excess liability coverage. It is equally clear
that, since every uninsured motorist coverage is now of a primary nature,
the premium to be charged must be adjusted accordingly. 4 This eventual
74. For the uninsured motorist coverage here involved, Blumling paid a premium of
$2.00.
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adjustment must also have an immediate impact upon the general motor-
ing public, for they will be the ones required to absorb the additional cost
of the coverage.
A more significant impact resulting from the Harleysville decision oc-
curs in the more general field. Clearly this decision provides for more
substantial protection from injuries sustained upon the public highways.
This protection is clearly for the benefit of the general public and, at
first glance, should be heartily accepted by that public. However, the
necessary extension of this decision brings Pennsylvania one step closer
to the compulsory liability insurance program. Although other states
have adopted such programs, Pennsylvania has never attempted to force
upon the public the necessity of obtaining insurance coverage. The
financial responsibility laws of Pennsylvania7 5 have been adequate thus
far; but the decision in the Harleysville case, in effect, alters the entire
tenure of this act by making in a limited sense automobile liability in-
surance co pn,,ulsory.
It is the opinion of this writer that the supreme court in rendering
its decision was clearly motivated by a desire to provide maximum pro-
tection for the motoring public. It can be argued that, if the legislature
had not intended to provide this maximum coverage, the statute itself
should have created the limitations. However, in view of Pennsylvania's
long standing reluctance to accept compulsory liability insurance, it is
submitted that the statute did not contemplate the result here reached.
However, the wording of the statute, in view of the mounting carnage on
Pennsylvania's highways, required and demanded the interpretation
placed upon the statute by the court. There can be no doubt that the
legislature intended to provide for the general public welfare in enacting
the uninsured motorist law and it must, therefore, follow that the supreme
court is, and was completely justified in extending the application of this
statute to the facts presented in the Harleysville case. It is further sub-
mitted that this decision will stem any public outcry for compulsory
liability insurance because the effect of the decision is, as previously
noted, to create such compulsory coverage. Realistically, the motoring
public of Pennsylvania must be prepared to absorb the reasonable and
necessary cost of this protection.
It should be noted that this decision by no means concludes the
judicial history of the uninsured motorist statute. Rather, this decision
concerns itself with the narrow issue of recovery under the terms of more
than one uninsured motorist policy. It is safe to predict that the ensuing
years will see the uninsured motorist statute submitted to continual in-
terpretation by the supreme court. The questions concerning allowing
75. For the provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law,
see, PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 75, § 1401 et seq. (Supp. 1967).
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credits for workman's compensation payments and medical payments
coverage still remain unresolved in the area of uninsured motorist
coverage. Other areas to be resolved will include the question of co-opera-
tion between the insured and the insurer, the question of enforceability of
arbitration awards, the willingness or unwillingness to submit, in the
first instance, to arbitration. It is, therefore, clear that Pattani v. Key-
stone set the stage for Harleysville v. Blumling which, in turn, has opened
the door to years of continued litigation in the field of uninsured motorist
coverage.
